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FOREWORD:
CAN GLUCKSBERG SURVIVE LAWRENCE?
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE END OF LIFE AND
PERSONAL AUTONOMY
Yale Kamisar*
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined to find a right to
physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the Constitution. Not a single
Justice dissented. One would expect such a ruling to be quite se-
cure. But Lawrence v. Texas, holding that a state cannot make
consensual homosexual conduct a crime, is not easy to reconcile
with Glucksberg. Lawrence certainly takes a much more expansive
view of substantive due process than did Glucksberg. It is conceiv-
able that the five Justices who made up the Lawrence majority-all
of whom still sit on the Court-might overrule Glucksberg. For
various reasons, however, this seems improbable.
Unlike the situation with respect to the pre-Lawrence era,
Glucksberg does not stigmatize any politically vulnerable group.
When there is no democratic defect in the political process, there is
much to be said for courts deferring to reasonable legislative judg-
ments. Moreover, unlike the developments preceding Lawrence,
there has been no emerging awareness of a right or liberty to enlist
the assistance of a physician in committing suicide. No state supreme
court has found a right to PAS in its own state constitution. Nor, in
the decade since Glucksberg, has any state legislature legalized PAS.
And attempts have been made to do so in some twenty states.
In addition, various considerations might cause a court to balk at
constitutionalizing PAS for the terminally ill. Such a right is not
easily cabined. If personal autonomy extends to the time and man-
ner of one's death, why doesn't it also apply whenever a competent
person believes that death is better than continued life? Once the
right to PAS is grounded on self-determination or personal auton-
omy in controlling one's own life and death, it no longer seems
plausible to limit it to the terminally ill. Why should people who
have to endure pain, suffering, or indignity for a much longer time
than the terminally ill (often defined as those with six months or
less to live) be denied this right? The argument made by many pro-
ponents of PAS that the right to forgo medical treatment and the
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Clarence Darrow Distinguished
University Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
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right to PAS are merely subcategories of the same broad right is
not convincing. Most of the two million people who die every year
in this country do so in hospitals and long-term care institutions
and do so after a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment has
been made. If medical treatment could not be rejected, vast num-
bers of patients would be at the mercy of every technological
advance. (For example, Nancy Cruzan could have been kept alive
in her persistent vegetative state for thirty years.) Allowing a pa-
tient to die at some point is a practical condition upon the
successful operation of medicine. The same can hardly be said of
PAS.
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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, in Washington v. Glucksberg,' the Court declined to find a
right to physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the Constitution. Not a single
Justice dissented.! One would expect such a ruling to be quite secure. But
Glucksberg faces an uncertain future.
I. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
2. But see infra text accompanying notes 67-78.
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The Court also declined to find a right to PAS in the companion case of
Vacco v. Quill.' In Quill, the Court rejected the argument that because New
York permitted competent persons to refuse lifesaving medical treatment but
prohibited competent persons not on life support from doing "essentially the
same thing," the state's assisted-suicide ban violated equal protection. As in
Glucksberg, there was no dissenting opinion.
Despite the apparently clear signal sent by these opinions, ten years later
it remains uncertain whether Glucksberg and Quill are in fact still good law.
This Symposium will explore many of the issues surrounding the two cases:
their place in constitutional doctrine, the ways in which they highlight
problems in constitutional theory' and contemporary moral theory,6 and their
practical effect for physicians and patients.7 Before turning to these pieces, I
will lay out the arguments why these cases---especially Glucksberg--could
conceivably be overturned, but why, in the end, they are likely to remain
good law.
I. WHY THE COURT MIGHT OVERRULE GLUCKSBERG
Recent decisions, an expansive recognition of personal autonomy, and
the complicated opinions in Glucksberg all undermine Glucksberg's con-
tinuing vitality.
A. The Potential Impact of Lawrence
The principal reason Glucksberg stands on shaky ground is Lawrence v.
Texas,' which overruled Bowers v. Hardwick9 and held that "[t]he State can-
not demean [the] existence [of homosexuals] or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime."' As Brian Hawkins has ob-
served, "Although the Lawrence majority opinion never cited Glucksberg,
the aspersions Lawrence cast on Bowers inevitably fell with equal force on
3. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
4. Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1479 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi,
Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1517 (2008); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1501 (2008).
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2008).
6. Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1571
(2008); Marc Spindelman, Death, Dying, and Domination, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1641 (2008).
7. Herbert Hendin & Kathleen Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Medical
Perspective, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1613 (2008); Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States:
The Progress ofGlucksberg's Invitation to States to Address End of Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1593 (2008).
8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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Glucksberg" "-especially the narrow view of substantive due process
Glucksberg shared with Bowers.
Mr. Hawkins is not the only commentator to call attention to the fact
that, despite the heavy damage Lawrence seems to have inflicted on
Glucksberg, it failed to so much as cite the earlier case. Two of Lawrence's
strongest critics have called this failure a "striking manifestation of
Lawrence's haughtiness toward the kind of legal analysis that had become
conventional in the case law."' 2 "The rejection of the Glucksberg test," they
continue, "is not only unacknowledged and unexplained, but it is a total
rejection."' 3
Glucksberg had insisted, as had Bowers, that in order for a right or lib-
erty to come within the substantive reach of the Due Process Clauses it had
to be (1) "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" and (2) susceptible of a "careful descrip-
tion" ' 4 (whatever that means). 5 Although the Lawrence Court did conclude
that the historical grounds relied on by the Bowers majority were somewhat
doubtful,16 it could not, and did not, claim that the right or liberty at issue
was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'7
As long as Bowers remained on the books, it served as a buffer between
the implications of the line of cases originating with Griswold v. Connecti-
cut" and any alleged constitutional right to PAS. As Jed Rubenfeld noted
almost two decades ago, "The laws struck down under the rubric of privacy
11. Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since
Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 410 (2006). Mr. Hawkins goes on to say, however, that
his scrutiny of 102 post-Lawrence lower court cases "indicates that the Glucksberg Doctrine has not
only survived Lawrence, but has flourished." Id. at 411. Indeed, "[m]ost cases from [the survey]
ignore Lawrence completely." Id.
12. Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 1555, 1578 (2004).
13. Id. at 1579; see also Calabresi, supra note 4, at 1525.
14. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21, 723, 727 (1997). For the view that
O'Connor, one of the four other Justices who joined Rehnquist's opinion, did not even agree with
Rehnquist that a fundamental liberty interest--one that requires the state to come forward with a
strong justification for intruding on that interest-has to be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," see Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, N.Y REV.
BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, at 40, and Cass R. Sunstein, Supreme Caution: Once Again, the High Court
Takes Only Small Steps, WASH. POST, July 6, 1997, at C1.
As to whether Chief Justice Rehnquist's Glucksberg framework accurately describes substan-
tive due process cases preceding Glucksberg, compare, in this Symposium, Chemerinsky, supra note
4, at 1504-06, and Smith, supra note 6, at 1572, with Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1544-45.
15. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 1489-91, which maintains that there is always more than
one way to plausibly define the particular liberty at issue.
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
17. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold was followed by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678
(1977).
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have had a peculiar tendency to gravitate around sexuality .. .."'9 If the
Court were to build on these cases, the next one was likely to be a case es-
tablishing the right of homosexual persons, no less than heterosexual ones,
to choose the sexual intimacy they share with adult partners in private.
Unless and until such a ruling was handed down, any constitutional right to
20PAS seemed far away.
Bowers seemingly brought the development of privacy to an abrupt halt.
Indeed, it threatened to do even more than that. The Court's prior cases had
recognized three protected areas-marriage, procreation, and family rela-
tionships. The Bowers Court, however, thought it "evident" that none of the
protected categories "bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.' 2' Moreover, the Court
did not even see any unifying principle connecting the three recognized pri-
vacy categories. To quote Rubenfeld a final time:
[Alfter [Bowers], we know that the right to privacy protects some aspects
of marriage, procreation, and child-rearing, but we do not know why. By
identifying three disparate applications ungrounded by any unifying prin-
ciple, the majority effectively severed the roots of the privacy doctrine,
leaving only the branches, which will presumably in short order dry up and
wither away."
As long as Bowers remained good law-as long as the Court considered
itself "com[ing] nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made con-
stitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution"" 3-there was no chance that a right to PAS would be
found in the Constitution. But Bowers has been overruled-and all five
members of the Lawrence majority are still on the Court.
One will search the Lawrence opinion in vain for any indication that the
Court believed expanding the substantive reach of the Due Process Clauses
is an act to be strongly resisted. If anything, the Lawrence Court indicated
the contrary:
[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses ... knew times
can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Consti-
tution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in
24their own search for greater freedom.
19. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 738 (1989).
20. See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735, 763-64 (1995).
21. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
22. Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 749.
23. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
24. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
June 20081 1457
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B. The Revivification of the "Mystery of Life" Passage
No treatment of Lawrence's impact on Glucksberg would be complete
without some discussion of the significance of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey' s 25 "mystery-of-life" passage:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education.... These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
26
were they formed under compulsion of the State.
This sweeping language did not make much of an impression on Chief
Justice Rehnquist, author of the "opinion of the Court" in Glucksberg. As
Rehnquist viewed the passage, all it did was "describe[], in a general way
and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that
this Court has identified as ... protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
2 7
He added, "That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are
so protected, and Casey did not suggest otherwise. 2 s
If the Court revisits the question(s) presented in Glucksberg, a number
of Justices, perhaps a majority, are likely to take the mystery-of-life passage
a good deal more seriously. When the Lawrence Court quoted the mystery-
of-life passage with approval, it prefaced the quotation with the comment
that this language "explain[s] the respect the Constitution demands for the
autonomy of the person in making [various] choices," such as "personal de-
cisions relating to marriage, procreation ... family relationships, [and] child
rearing. ' 9 The Lawrence Court seemed to be trying to provide the "unifying
principle" for the "privacy" or "autonomy" cases that the Court did not-or
could not-find in Bowers.3° And if we take the stirring words of the mys-
25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26. Id. at 851, quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
27. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
28. Id. at 727-28 (citation omitted).
29. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
30. Cf Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union & the ACLU of Texas as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 3, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164132. The ACLU argued:
[lIt is only a unifying principle of personal autonomy that serves to limit an otherwise boundless, ty-
rannical state power over every detail of personal life. And only such a unifying principle renders
this Court's privacy decisions a coherent whole, instead of a series of disjointed pin-points of con-
stitutional protection unconnected by principle or logic.
Id. "Counsel of Record" for the ACLU brief was Professor Laurence H. Tribe, who also represented
the plaintiffs in Quill.
1458 [Vol. 106:1453
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tery-of-life passage seriously, as Lawrence did, how can we ignore the de-
sire of competent people to seek assistance in ending their lives? Indeed, the
decision to "shuffle[] off this mortal coil"'" because one has arrived at the
conclusion that continued life is worse than immediate death would seem to
fit some of the wording in the Casey passage better than any decision one
32
can imagine.
Decisions whether (and whom) to marry and with whom to share sexual
intimacy are important. So is the decision whether to have children or to get
an abortion. But is not controlling the time and manner of one's own death
the most evident way-the most profound way-to "define one's own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life"?"
C. Despite the Lack of a Single Dissent, Glucksberg
Was a Shaky Ruling from the Outset
Another reason the Glucksberg decision faces an uncertain future is the
discordant note struck by five concurring opinions-especially Justice
O'Connor's, who purported to join Chief Justice Rehnquist's four-Justice
opinion but really did not. These five concurring opinions make for frustrat-
ing reading and a shaky ruling.
A decade ago, Kathryn Tucker, a contributor to this Symposium, was the
lead lawyer for the plaintiffs in the Glucksberg case. Ms. Tucker and her
colleagues formulated the question presented as "[w]hether the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of liberty protects the decision of a mentally com-
petent, terminally ill adult to bring about impending death in a certain,
humane, and dignified manner.'  Moreover, Ms. Tucker began her oral ar-
gument by telling the Supreme Court that "lt]his case presents the question
whether dying citizens in full possession of their mental faculties at the
31. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
32. This provides support for the view that the challenged restriction on PAS implicates a
fundamental right, but it does not end the inquiry. If the state's countervailing interests are powerful
enough, they may override the "liberty interest" in PAS. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106
YALE L.J. 1123, 1124 (1997) (arguing that even if there is a fundamental right to PAS, there are state
interests sufficiently compelling to render prohibitions on PAS constitutional). But see Chemerinsky,
supra note 4 (arguing that the Glucksberg Court should have applied strict scrutiny and struck down
the prohibition on PAS).
For the view that Lawrence points the way to an alternative to the modem doctrine of funda-
mental rights that would require the government to justify its restriction on liberty instead of
requiring the individual to establish that the liberty being restricted is "fundamental," see Randy
Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-03 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
21, 35-36.
33. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1337-38 (2d ed. 1988); cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 4,
at 1506-07.
34. Brief of Respondents at i, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 708925 (emphasis added).
June 20081 1459
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threshold of death due to terminal illness have the liberty to choose to cross
that threshold in a humane and dignified manner."3
Similarly, Professor Laurence Tribe, who argued the companion case of
Vacco v. Quill, told the Court that the liberty at stake in that case was the
"liberty, when facing imminent and inevitable death, not to be forced by the
government to endure... pain and suffering. 36 He also emphasized that the
freedom he was advocating was "the freedom, at this threshold at the end of
life, not to be a creature of the state but to have some voice in the question
of how much pain one is really going through."37
It is no secret why the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the Glucksberg and
Quill cases insisted that the right they were asserting was limited to the ter-
minally ill. The best chance they had of prevailing in the courts-perhaps
the only chance-was to ask for a narrow right to PAS, one confined to the
terminally ill. Such a limited right would cause less alarm and command
more support than a general right to assisted suicide.
Thus, as I expressed it a decade ago, if all that the Supreme Court de-
cided in Glucksberg and Quill was that there is no general right to enlist the
aid of a physician in committing suicide, "the Court decided virtually noth-
ing-because everybody agreed that there was no such right. 3s After
rereading Glucksberg many times, especially in light of what other commen-
tators have had to say about it, I have come to the unhappy conclusion that it
is possible to read the physician-assisted suicide cases as having decided
"virtually nothing."
Indeed, the more I reread the various opinions in Glucksberg, the more I
get the feeling that this may be the most confusing and the most fragile 9-0
decision in Supreme Court history.
Chief Justice Rehnquist is not blameless. He contributed to the uncer-
tainty about the holding by stating the question presented in different ways.
At one point he told us that "the question before us is whether the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so."' 9 This is in-
correct on two counts. First, nobody was asking for "a right to commit
suicide"--only a right to a physician's assistance in doing so. Neither sui-
cide nor attempted suicide is a criminal offense in Washington (or any other
state)-only aiding another in committing suicide is criminally proscribed.
40
35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-27, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1997 WL
13671 (emphasis added).
36. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55-56, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-
1858), 1997 WL 13672 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
38. Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 82
MINN. L. REv. 895, 912 (1998).
39. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723. Elsewhere, however, Rehnquist does make it clear that the
issue to be resolved was not whether the Court's "liberty jurisprudence" supported a right to suicide,
but whether it supported a right to assisted suicide. Id. at 724.
40. N.Y STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUI-
CIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT, at xi (1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
1460 [Vol. 106:1453
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And second, nobody was claiming a right to a physician's assistance in
committing suicide generally--only a right to a physician's help in very
special circumstances.
Whatever Rehnquist's reasons for framing the question presented this
way, at other places in his opinion he framed the issue more specifically.
For example, at one point he called attention to the fact that the Ninth Cir-
cuit had "held that [Washington] State's assisted-suicide ban was
unconstitutional 'as applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to
hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians.' -42
Moreover, in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion, Rehnquist concluded
that the Court was "hold[ing] that [Washington's assisted-suicide ban] does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or 'as applied to
competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
medication prescribed by their doctors.' ,4
When one reads Rehnquist's opinion in its entirety, there is little doubt,
if any, that he believed he was rejecting the contention that Washington
State's assisted-suicide ban violated due process insofar as it prevented ter-
minally ill people from obtaining a physician's assistance in bringing about
death. He believed he was holding that a state could, consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment, reject a "sliding-scale approach" to protecting lives,
whereby the "weight" of the state's interest "depends on the 'medical condi-
tion and the wishes of the person whose life is at stake."'"
Nevertheless, a concurring Justice O'Connor seized on Rehnquist's
broadest description of the question before the Court and announced that
she was "join[ing] the Court's opinion[] because [she] agree[d] that there is
no generalized right to 'commit suicide.' ,4' This also permitted her to say
that in light of the "facial challenge[]" to the Washington statute (as opposed
to an "as applied" challenge), she saw "no need to reach" the question of
"whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering
has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of• -- .I ,,46
his or her imminent death .
41. Perhaps deliberately avoiding the terms "suicide" and "assisted suicide" (terms that carry
strongly negative associations), the Ninth Circuit had used such synonyms as "right to die," "con-
trolling the time and manner of one's death," "choosing a dignified and humane death:' and
"individuals' right to determine their own destiny." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790, 801, 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; see also id.
at 798-99. As I have suggested elsewhere, Rehnquist may have been annoyed at what he may have
considered the Ninth Circuit's emotive and euphemistic language for "suicide" and believed that the
statement of the "question presented" should feature that term prominently. See Kamisar, supra note
38, at 913.
42. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 837). Rehnquist
referred to this language again later in the opinion. Id. at 709 n.6, 732-33.
43. Id. at 735 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838). He then dropped a footnote
which added, "We emphasize that we today reject the [Ninth Circuit's] specific holding that the
statute is unconstitutional 'as applied' to a particular class." Id. at 735 n.24.
44. See id. at 729 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 817).
45. Id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. Id.
June 2008]
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Justice O'Connor's approach is problematic in several respects. First,
"generalized right to commit suicide" is O'Connor's phrase, not
Rehnquist's. He never spoke of a "general" or "generalized" right to commit
suicide. Second, Rehnquist's statement that the issue involved a "right to
commit suicide" was itself flawed, as described above. Finally, as already
noted, nobody claimed a general right to obtain the active intervention of a
physician (or anyone else) to help bring about one's suicide-only a particu-
larized right to do so when one is experiencing great suffering and facing
imminent death. This particularized right-the only right asserted by the
plaintiffs in the Glucksberg and Quill cases-was the one Justice O'Connor
saw no need to reach.
Although formally Justice O'Connor provided the much-needed fifth
vote, it is highly doubtful that she really did. Although she stated that sheS- 47
was "join[ing]" Rehnquist's opinion, she certainly didn't "join" the deci-
sion Rehnquist believed he had arrived at.4' Thus, although Rehnquist's
opinion is called "the opinion of the Court," it does not seem to deserve that
designation.
Justice Ginsburg, meanwhile, concurred in the Court's judgments "sub-
49
stantially for the reasons" stated in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.
Justice Breyer joined O'Connor's opinion as well, "except insofar as it joins
the majority. 5 ° He, no less than Justice O'Connor, was concerned about the
need of terminally ill patients to avoid pain.5' Breyer described the asserted
right at stake as a "right to die with dignity,' 12 one that would have at its core
"personal control over the manner of death, professional medical assistance,
and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering-
combined."53 However, Justice Breyer saw no need to decide whether such
an asserted right should be classified as "fundamental. 54 For "the avoidance
of severe physical pain (connected with death) would have to constitute an
essential part of any successful claim and ... as Justice O'Connor points
47. Id.
48. However, Justice O'Connor certainly didn't dissent from Rehnquist's opinion either.
There is no indication, for example, that she interprets the stirring language in Casey any more
expansively than did Chief Justice Rehnquist or that she has any more difficulty than he did accept-
ing the distinction between forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment and actually intervening to
bring about death. Moreover, she does say that "[t]here is no reason to think the democratic process
will not strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent indi-
viduals who would seek to end their suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who might
seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure." Id. at 737. It is also possible to read Justice
O'Connor's opinion as indicating that she is inclined to agree with Rehnquist that the state's inter-
ests are sufficient to justify a ban on assisted suicide even for terminally ill patients suffering great
pain, so long as dying patients can obtain palliative care.
49. Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
50. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 790.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 791.
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out, the laws before us do not force a dying person to undergo that kind of
pain.""
Since Justices Stevens and Souter, who also wrote concurring opinions
in Glucksberg, seemed to favor a right to PAS even more than Justices
O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer did, at least for compelling circum-
56
stances, there is reason to believe that five members of the Glucksberg
Court were inclined to recognize a right to effective pain medication even if
it might hasten death and to resist any legislative efforts to restrict the ability
of terminally ill patients to obtain such pain relief.57
Justice Souter concluded that the challenged statute did not set up "one
of those 'arbitrary impositions' or 'purposeless restraints' at odds with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 One of the interests
the state put forward to justify the challenged statute was "dispositive" for
55. Id.
56. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REv. 54, 138-39 (1997); see also infra text accompanying notes 61-64,
72-78.
57. See Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks-Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitu-
tional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997); Kamisar, supra note 38, at
908-09. This point implicates a concept known as the "double effect" principle, which, in the con-
text of pain relief, means that a physician (a) may not administer a lethal dose of drugs for the very
purpose of killing the patient, but (b) may administer increasing dosages of drugs to relieve the
patient's increasing pain-even though doing so will foreseeably hasten or increase the risk of
death-so long as the dosage was not intended to produce death but to relieve pain. For a helpful
discussion of the "double effect" principle, see, in this Symposium, Smith, supra note 6, at 1578-
79.
As I have discussed elsewhere, the view that pain relief must be permitted even when the level
of medication is high enough to bring about death helps PAS opponents, for one of their principal
arguments is that health professionals can effectively meet their patients' need for compassionate
end-of-life care without yielding to requests for assisted suicide. Kamisar, supra note 38, at 909-10.
In rare instances, it should be noted, nothing will relieve great pain and suffering except termi-
nal sedation, a technique which renders a dying patient unconscious or stuperous until the end
finally comes. See Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years after Quinlan: A Review of the Jurispru-
dence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 187 (2001). I share Professor Cantor's view
that some forms of terminal sedation take us into "legally uncharted territory." Id.; see also David
Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide; Embracing
Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947, 956-60 (1997) (likening some forms of terminal seda-
tion to active euthanasia). I also agree with Professor Cantor that it is "doubtful" that any of the
concurring Justices in Glucksberg who made favorable references to the use of analgesics at high
enough levels to cause unconsciousness were endorsing all forms of terminal sedation. Cantor,
supra, at 187.
It appears that pain or the fear of pain is less often a decisive factor when patients seek assisted
suicide than a feeling of "indignity," "degradation," or loss of control. See, e.g., Arthur E. Chin et al.,
Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The First Year's Experience, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED.
577, 581 tbl.3 (1999); Peter J. Hammer, Assisted Suicide and the Challenge of Individually Determined
Collective Rationality, in LAW AT THE END OF LIFE: THE SUPREME COURT AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 239,
263--64 (Carl E. Schneider ed., 2000); Eric A. Johnson, Assisted Suicide, Liberal Individualism, and
Visceral Jurisprudence: A Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 321, 324-27 (2003);
see also Hendin & Foley, supra note 7, at 1635-36. Some patients, therefore, will undoubtedly be
appalled by the helplessness and indignity brought about by some forms of terminal sedation, and
strongly resist these procedures (especially when they have several weeks to live). They will do so
even though there is no alternative way to ease their pain. This small category of cases probably
constitutes the strongest set of circumstances for PAS (or for active euthanasia).
58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Souter-a justification, he noted, that opposed the respondents'
claim "not with a moral judgment" contrary to those of the respondents,59
but with "a recognized state interest ... in protecting patients from mistak-
enly and involuntarily deciding to end their lives, and in guarding against
both voluntary and involuntary euthanasa.60
However, Justice Souter was quite sympathetic to the respondents' ar-
61guments. He was well aware that PAS proponents had an answer to the
concerns that all sorts of mistakes and abuses might occur if PAS were de-
criminalized: "state regulation with teeth. 62 For example, the state might
require two qualified physicians to confirm the patient's diagnosis and man-
date that the patient make repeated requests for PAS in the presence of at
least two witnesses over a specified timespan.6' But, he continued,
at least at this moment there are reasons for caution in predicting the effec-
tiveness of the teeth proposed. Respondents' proposals ... sound much
like the guidelines now in place in the Netherlands .... There is, however,
a substantial dispute today about what the Dutch experience shows....
The day may come when we can say with some assurance which side is
right, but for now it is the substantiality of the factual disagreement, and
the alternatives for resolving it, that matter. They are, for me, dispositive of
the due process claim at this time.64
Justice Souter ended his opinion by observing that he was not deciding the
respondents' claim "for all time," but "acknowledg[ing] the legislative insti-
tutional competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this time."65
I have saved Justice Stevens for last because his opinion, although de-
scribed as "concurring in the judgment," is primarily a dissent. Stevens
managed to accomplish this by the way he viewed the procedural nature of
the case. As spelled out earlier, it is fairly clear that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's four-person opinion concluded that the challenged statute was
constitutional both "on its face" and "as applied" to competent terminally ill
people. 6' But Justice Stevens maintained that Rehnquist had only decidedthat the challenged statute was constitutional "on its face."68
59. Id. at 782. As to whether a moral judgment is a valid state interest, compare the views of
two contributors to this Symposium, Barnett, supra note 32 at 36-38, and Smith, supra note 6, at
1584-88.
60. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 778-79, 781-82, 785.
62. Id. at 785.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 785-86 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 789.
66. Id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44. For a helpful discussion of "on its face" and
"as applied" challenges in the Glucksberg context, see Sonia M. Suter, Ambivalent Unanimity: An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Holding, in LAW AT THE END OF LIFE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
AssISTED SUICIDE, supra note 57, at 25, 29-32.
68. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 739, 740 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor had also read Rehnquist's opinion as addressing only
a facial challenge to the Washington statute.69 But Justice Stevens went a
step further. He said, in effect, that none of the remaining plaintiffs had
standing to make an "as applied" challenge. He thought it significant that all
the patient-plaintiffs had died by the time the case reached the appellate
federal court.70 As for the physician-plaintiffs, none were "threatened with
prosecution for assisting in the suicide of a particular patient.
7
'
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist did not fully address Justice Stevens's
procedural argument, concurring Justice Souter did. He observed that
"[a]lthough the terminally ill original parties have died during the pendency
of this case, the four physicians who remain.., continue to request declara-
tory and injunctive relief for their own benefit in discharging their
obligations to other dying patients who request their help. ' 2
There is no reason to think that the three members of the Court who
joined Rehnquist's opinion (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) dis-
agreed with him about the procedural nature of the challenge to the
Washington statute. If they agreed, Souter's opinion means that on this issue
Rehnquist did speak for a majority of the Court.
As we have seen, Justice Stevens took a different, and narrower, view of
the challenge to the Washington statute. This enabled him to (a) "fully agree
with the Court" that the Due Process Clause "does not include a categorical
'right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so' ,73 yet (b) maintain that "there are times when [PAS] is entitled to consti-
tutional protection. 74
Stevens's claim that the Washington statute was only being challenged
"on its face" may have been quite weak, but his statement of a competent,
terminally ill person's need for-and right to-PAS when she seeks such
relief was quite powerful. Reading the Cruzan case" broadly (too broadly, I
69. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
70. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Id. If, as Justice Stevens maintained, physicians lacked standing to challenge laws pro-
hibiting assisted suicide, how could appellate courts ever consider a challenge as applied to
terminally ill patients? All terminally ill patients (often defined as those who will die within six
months) necessarily will die before completion of the litigation. In the Glucksberg case itself all but
one of the patient-plaintiffs had died even by the time the district court had issued its decision.
Moreover, the view that "physicians have standing to assert the legal rights of their patients has been
established in many cases." Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 665, 677.
72. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752-53 (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 753 ("I take it to
be true, as [the physician-plaintiffs] say, that the Washington statute prevents the exercise of a physi-
cian's 'best professional judgment to prescribe medications to [mentally competent, terminally ill]
patients in dosages that would enable them to act to hasten their own deaths.' ").
73. Id. at 741 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 723 (majority opinion)).
74. Id. at 742.
75. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). This case, ably discussed in
Louis Michael Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Cruzan, "The Right to Die," and the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 1991 Sup. CT. REV. 47, involved a woman (Nancy Beth Cruzan) who had
been in a persistent vegetative state for many years and was being kept alive by means of a feeding
tube. Her parents sought to discontinue the tubal feeding, but were rebuffed by hospital officials and
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submit), 76 and making proficient use of Casey's mystery-of-life language
(too much, I submit),77 Justice Stevens asserted as follows:
Given the irreversible nature of her illness and the progressive character of
her suffering, Nancy Cruzan's interest in refusing medical care was inci-
dental to her more basic interest in controlling the manner and timing of
her death .... [T]he source of Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse treatment
was not just a common-law rule ... [but] an aspect of a far broader and
more basic concept of freedom that is even older than the common law.
This freedom embraces ... a person's ... interest in dignity, and in deter-
mining the character of the memories that will survive long after her death.
... [S]ome state intrusions on the right to decide how death will be
encountered are ... intolerable. The now-deceased plaintiffs in this action
may in fact have had a liberty interest even stronger than Nancy Cruzan's
because, not only were they terminally ill, they were suffering constant and
severe pain. Avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's fi-
nal days incapacitated and in agony is certainly "[a]t the heart of [the]
liberty ... to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. 78
In the course of overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court quoted Justice
Stevens's dissent in Bowers with approval, 79 declaring that "Justice Stevens'
analysis [in the earlier case] should have been controlling ... and should
control here."80 Someday, when the Court revisits Glucksberg, as it
inevitably will, it may quote from Stevens's opinion in that case with
approval and say, once again, that his analysis then "should have been
controlling.., and should control here."'"
II. WHY THE COURT IS UNLIKELY TO ESTABLISH A RIGHT TO PAS
That Lawrence may lead the Court someday to find a right to PAS in the
Constitution is certainly conceivable. Despite the flaws in the various
turned to the courts. The state supreme court ruled that, in the absence of a living will, they had to
show "clear and convincing" evidence of their daughter's wish to be free of life support. The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed five to four, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, but assumed for purposes of the
case that a competent person would have a "constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. As noted elsewhere in this Symposium, five
members of the Cruzan Court-concurring Justice O'Connor and the four dissenters-seemed to go
further than the Chief Justice and to assert that the right of competent persons to reject lifesaving
medical treatment does exist. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1507-08. For the dramatic aftermath of
the Cruzan case, see Carl E. Schneider, The Road to Glucksberg, in LAW AT THE END OF LIFE: THE
SUPREME COURT AND ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra note 57, at 11, 18.
76. See infra Section I.D.
77. See infra Section N.C.
78. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 742-43, 745 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
79. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003).
80. Id. at 578.
81. Id.
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Glucksberg opinions, however, that ruling is likely to remain unchanged for
the foreseeable future. A number of considerations support this prediction.
Unlike the situation with respect to Bowers, Glucksberg did not demean
any politically vulnerable group. Moreover, unlike developments preceding
Lawrence, there has been no emerging awareness of a right or liberty to
enlist the assistance of a physician in committing suicide. No state court has
found a right to PAS in its own state constitution. Nor has any state legisla-
ture legalized PAS in the decade since Glucksberg.
In addition, various considerations might cause a court to balk at consti-
tutionalizing PAS for the terminally ill. Such a right is not easily cabined. If
personal autonomy extends to the time and manner of one's death, why
doesn't it also apply whenever a competent person believes that death is
better than continued life? And why shouldn't personal autonomy apply
when a patient is unable to commit the final act herself, but needs a health
professional to administer a lethal injection? (Such an act would constitute
euthanasia, not simply assisted suicide.)
A. The Rights of a Politically Vulnerable Group Are Not at Stake
"[W]hatever [its] rhetoric about sexual freedom in general," Cass Sunstein
has observed, one can view Lawrence as "really a case about the social subor-
dination of gays and lesbians. '82 Lawrence's words, he continues, "sound in
due process, but much of its music involves equal protection."" One might
add that, although the majority chose to decide the case on due process
grounds,84 some of the words in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion sound
in equal protection as well: "[Bowers's] continuance as precedent demeans
the lives of homosexual persons."85
It is hard to see, however, how the prohibition against physician-assisted
suicide subordinates or demeans any politically vulnerable group. After all,
"[d]ying people are clearly not a discrete and insular minority in the same,
sure way as are black people subject to race discrimination laws [or] women
subject to abortion restrictions.
82. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 27, 30; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2004).
83. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 30.
84. "Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause," observed
Kennedy, "some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to
prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
575.
85. Id. at 575; see also Karlan, supra note 82, at 1453-54; Miranda Oshige McGowan, From
Outlaws to Ingroups: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1313 (2004) ("Gays and lesbians win in Lawrence... because the challenged
legislation explicitly targeted gays, and gays constituted a group that, in the Court's eyes, is socially
salient.").
86. Robert A. Burt, Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide: Will Lightning Strike
Thrice?, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 159, 179 (1996).
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During the oral arguments in Glucksberg, three members of the Court,
Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, made essentially the same point.
Justice O'Connor reiterated this point in her concurring opinion:
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family
member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic
process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of termi-
nally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their
suffering and the State's interest in protecting those who might seek to end
life mistakenly or under pressure."
That prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia does not subordinate or
demean any distinct groups is not all that one can say. One can go a large
step further and note that a ban on PAS protects the poor and the socially
disadvantaged. Consider the observations, findings and conclusions of the
twenty-four member, ongoing, blue-ribbon New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law, which unanimously recommended that New York laws
prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia not be changed. 9 In the preface
to its 181-page report, the task force expressed its belief that (a) "the prac-
tices would be profoundly dangerous for large segments of the population,
especially in light of the widespread failure of American medicine to treat
pain adequately or to diagnose and treat depression in many cases," and
(b) the risks "would be most severe for those whose autonomy and well-
being are already compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical
care, or membership in a stigmatized social group.' 9°
87. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 39-42.
88. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1146 (observing that when the issue is close and "there is no democ-
ratic defect in the underlying political process, [courts] should not strike down reasonable legislative
judgments").
89. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at vii. The task force, convened by Governor Mario
Cuomo in 1985, was made up of eight medical doctors (two of whom were deans of medical
schools), two bioethicists who were not medical doctors, four lawyers, six clergymen (one of whom
was also a law professor), the state commissioner of health, the state commissioner on the quality of
care for the mentally disabled, and a member of the New York Civil Liberties Union. In addition,
three medical doctors and a nurse served as consultants. Neither PAS nor euthanasia were on the
agenda initially presented to the task force, but it decided to grapple with these issues when public
debate about the practices intensified. Id.
90. Id. at vii-viii; see also id. at 125, 143; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719, 732 (quoting TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 120).
Consider, too, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedly et al. eds., 2001), especially the summary at pages 2-3. Consider,
as well, a recent study detailing how "[dleeply imbedded attitudes about race influence the way
doctors care for their African-American patients." Stephen Smith, Tests of ER trainees find signs of
race bias in care: Study seeks root of known disparity, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2007, at Al (report-
ing on Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and its Predictions of
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007)).
As pointed out elsewhere in this Symposium, however, reports from Oregon indicate that "the
option of physician-assisted dying has not been unwillingly forced upon those who are poor, unedu-
cated, uninsured, or otherwise disadvantaged." Tucker, supra note 7, at 1604. Indeed, one recent
annual report "found that a higher level of education is strongly associated with the use of physi-
cian-assisted dying." Id.
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B. There Is No "Emerging Recognition" of a Right or
Freedom to Practice PAS
The Lawrence majority downplayed the debate over whether, as the
Bowers Court had claimed, proscriptions against homosexual conduct had
"ancient roots."'" Instead, it emphasized that the past half century had seen
"an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining
to sex. 92
The first evidence cited of this "emerging awareness" was an event that
occurred in 1955: when promulgating its Model Penal Code, the American
Law Institute "made clear that it did not recommend or provide for 'criminal
penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private.' ,13 Six years
later, "Illinois changed its laws to conform to the Model Penal Code" and
"[o]ther states soon followed. 94
Nothing comparable, however, has occurred with respect to PAS. In-
deed, almost the exact opposite has taken place. The same Model Penal
Code that decriminalized homosexual conduct declined to do the same for
assisted suicide. Instead, it "create[d] a separate offense of aiding or solicit-
ing suicide,"95 explaining that "[t]he fact that penal sanctions will prove
ineffective to deter [a suicidal individual from committing the act himself]
does not mean that the criminal law is equally powerless to influence the
behavior of those who would aid or induce another to take his own life. 96
The second piece of evidence cited by the Lawrence Court to support its
view of an "emerging awareness" was an event that took place in 1957: a
committee advising the British Parliament recommended the repeal of laws
punishing homosexual conduct.97 The substance of these recommendations
was enacted ten years later.9"
However, PAS proponents did not fare well when, almost four decades
after this recommendation, another British committee, the House of Lords
Select Committee on Medical Ethics, concluded that it could "identify no
circumstances in which assisted suicide should be permitted, nor do we see
any reason to distinguish between the act of a doctor or of any other person
in this connection.
91. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-70 (2003).
92. Id. at 572.
93. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)).
94. Id.
95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1962), reprinted in 2 AM.
LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 100 (1985).
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt.
97. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (referring to the Wolfenden Report).
98. Id. at 573. For a critique of the Court's citation to foreign sources of law, see, in this
Symposium, Calabresi, supra note 4, at 1539-41.
99. SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHIcs, REPORT, 1993-94, H.L. 21-1 para. 262, at 54.
This report is sometimes called the Walton Report, after the Chair of the Committee, Lord Walton.
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The Lawrence Court deemed it significant that five years before Bowers
was decided the European Court of Human Rights had ruled that a law pro-
hibiting consensual homosexual conduct infringed the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (sometimes
called the European Convention on Human Rights)) °° But two decades later,
the same European court concluded that a ban on assisted suicide did not
violate any provision of the same European Convention.' '
The Lawrence majority also seemed to be impressed by the fact that
"[t]he courts of five different States have declined to follow [Bowers] in in-
terpreting provisions in their own state constitutions parallel to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 2 But no comparable devel-
opment has occurred with respect to PAS.
When the case that came to be known as Washington v. Glucksberg was
working its way up to the Supreme Court, a panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit observed that "[in all the years] of our existence no
constitutional right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and up-
held by a court of final jurisdiction."'0 3 That statement is still valid today.
Not a single state supreme court has relied on any of its own state constitu-
tional provisions'"" or on any U.S. Supreme Court decision to declare PAS a
protected right.
The Lawrence Court also deemed it noteworthy that "[t]he 25 states with
laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are
reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual
conduct."'0 5 The trend in the political arena regarding PAS, however, has
been strongly against legalizing it.
In the decade immediately preceding Glucksberg, interest in PAS and
the controversy over it intensified greatly. The principal reasons were (a) the
Washington and California initiatives to legalize PAS (which failed) and the
Oregon initiative (which succeeded), (b) the rulings by the two federal
courts of appeals in Glucksberg and Quill that PAS was a constitutionally
protected right (rulings ultimately overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court),
and (c) the exploits of Jack Kevorkian. During this eventful era, sixteen bills
The report is noted in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997), and substantial
extracts are set forth in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 96
(John Keown ed., 1995).
100. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 21 (1981)).
101. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. 157.
102. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
103. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 E3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (Noonan, J.).
104. Since Glucksberg, it is worth noting, the highest courts of two states have rejected the
argument that the people of these states are entitled to PAS under state constitutions that contain
special provisions expressly safeguarding privacy. See Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001);
Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997). For more on the Alaska case, compare Erwin
Chemerinsky, Privacy and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill the Promise, 20 ALASKA L.
REV. 29 (2003), with Johnson, supra note 57.
105. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
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expressly prohibiting assisted suicide were enacted into law. On the other
hand, although bills to legalize PAS were introduced in more than twenty
state legislatures during the same time period, not a single one passed.' °7
To be sure, Oregon voters did approve a "death with dignity" initiative
in 1994 (a vote Oregon reaffirmed three years later), but Oregon is still the
only state in the union to have legalized PAS. A decade later, the Oregon
vote looks like a striking exception to PAS proponents' lack of success gen-
erally in the political arena.10s
C. No Obvious Stopping Point
Though proponents claim a new right may be limited to PAS for termi-
nally ill patients, the limits they impose appear difficult to defend both in
principle and in practice.
1. Once Established, Can (Will) PAS Be Limited to the "Terminally Ill"?
The first difficulty comes in the limitation of PAS to the "terminally
ill." '10 If personal autonomy or "the right to define one's own concept of ex-
istence" and "the mystery of human life""' extends to the time and manner
of one's death-if "the right not to be killed, like other rights, should be
106. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Assisted Suicide? Not in My State, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1997, at A21.
107. Timothy Egan, Assisted Suicide Comes Full Circle, to Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1997, at Al; Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 106; see also infra note 108.
108. The failure of PAS proponents to achieve success in any state legislature continues. A
Michigan ballot initiative legalizing PAS failed in 1998, and between 1994 (the year the Oregon
initiative was approved) and 2007, bills to legalize PAS failed in twenty-one states. Such bills failed
five or more times in six states: Arizona, California, Hawaii, New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
Kathi Hamlon, Int'l Task Force on Euthanasia & Assisted Suicide, Failed Attempts to Legalize
Euthanasia/Assisted-Suicide in the United States, http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/usa.htm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
109. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185 ("Once a legislature
abandons a categorical prohibition against physician assisted suicide, there is no obvious stopping
point."), quoted in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 n.23.
110. "Terminal illness" is frequently defined as a condition or illness that will result in death
within six months' time. See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 44 (1996). How-
ever, "[t]he few studies that have been done indicate that the designation of six months as a terminal
period is entirely arbitrary and that physicians vary drastically in their interpretation of what consti-
tutes this terminal phase of illness." Id. at 45; see also 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 11.9, at
96 (2d ed. 1995); Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide
for the Terminally 111, 21 HASTINGS CO ST. L.Q. 799, 814-18 (1994).
I have assumed, as have most commentators, that "terminal illness" is a manageable classifica-
tion. However, according to a five-hospital empirical study by Professor Joanne Lynn and five other
health professionals, this assumption is quite shaky. Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the "Terminally
Ill": Insights from SUPPORT, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 311, 334 (1996) ("Deciding who should be counted
'terminally ill' will pose such severe difficulties that it seems untenable as a criterion for permitting
[PAS]."); see also Hendin & Foley, supra note 7, at 1633-34.
111. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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waivable when the person makes a competent decision that continued life is
no longer wanted.., but is instead worse than no further life at all"' "-why
should this right be limited to the "terminally ill"?
It seems strange that someone in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease,
anticipating and fearing mental deterioration some years down the road,
would be ineligible for PAS because the disease has not progressed far
enough to render her "terminally ill." Why does a victim of Alzheimer's
disease have to wait until the final phase of the disease to request PAS, when
she will no longer be competent to make the request? And what of the per-
son who is paralyzed from the neck down, but has twenty years to live? The
mangled survivor of a car accident? One suffering from not yet "terminal"
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease) or AIDS?
The argument that personal autonomy or the liberty to "define one's own
concept of existence" and "the mystery of life" leads to a constitutional right
to PAS-but only for the terminally ill-troubled Justice Ginsberg. At one
point during the oral arguments, when the lawyer for the Glucksberg plain-
tiffs had spoken of the need for PAS for terminally ill people who wanted to
be free of pain and suffering, Justice Ginsberg retorted, "[A] lot of people
would fit the category."" 3 How, she wondered, "do you ... leave out the rest
of the world who would fit the same standards?"
'
"
4
As Kathryn Tucker observes elsewhere in this Symposium, there is a
good deal of distance between terminally ill patients who enlist the assis-
tance of a physician to end their lives in order to avoid further suffering or
loss of dignity and the typical suicide, who, "in a moment of despair, com-
mits a completely senseless and utterly tragic act.""' 5 But there are many
suicides committed by individuals who are neither mentally ill nor termi-
nally ill that can hardly be called "senseless." As one proponent of assisted
suicide has observed, "[s]urely under a variety of circumstances life may be
unendurable to a reasonable person, even though he does not face the pros-
pect of immediate and painful death."
'
"1 6
Once a right to PAS is established, it is difficult to believe it will be con-
fined to the terminally ill for very long. It will be difficult to justify drawing
112. Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992,
at 10, 14.
113. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 50.
114. Id. Justice Scalia made a similar point. Id. at 27; Excerpts From the Supreme Court Oral
Argument on Physician-Assisted Suicide, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1997, at A16.
115. Tucker, supra note 7, at 1596 n.7 (quoting James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death
with Dignity in Montana, 65 MONT. L. REv. 309, 314 (2004)).
116. Alan Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
229, 241 (M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980). According to a survey of ancient attitudes
about suicide undertaken by the Ninth Circuit in Glucksberg, suicide has been deemed a rational and
sensible act if, among other things, it is caused by "weariness of life," "fear of dishonor," if "your
existence is hateful to you," or "if you are overwhelmed by fate" or "bowed with grief." Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 807 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). For a list of situations which "various writers have regarded as
good and sufficient reasons for ending life," see Richard B. Brandt, The Rationality of Suicide, in
SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, supra, at 117, 123.
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a line between (a) the terminally ill and (b) other seriously ill or impaired
persons, when those in the second category may have to endure pain or suf-
fering or indignity for a much longer time. And if the Casey language does
apply to assisted suicide, it would be disingenuous to permit only a few
people to define their own concept of existence. Why should only a small
fraction of the population be allowed to exercise a right that is "at the heart
of liberty"? Once the right to PAS is grounded on "self-determination" in
making one's most intimate choices and controlling one's own life and
death, it no longer appears plausible to limit it to the terminally ill." 7
2. Once the Right to PAS is Established, Will (Should) the Thin Line
Between Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia Hold?
PAS is seen by many as offering more protection against potential abuse
than active euthanasia, "since the final act is in the patient's hands.""' Thus,
PAS causes less alarm than euthanasia and commands more support. More-
over, although the term "euthanasia" "apparently first appeared in the
English language in the early seventeenth century in its original meaning-a
gentle, easy death,"" 9 somewhere along the way it has become for many a
dirty word.
1 20
It would hardly be surprising, therefore, if a goodly number of PAS pro-
ponents believed that at this point in the development of the law governing
death and dying, the less talk about euthanasia the better. They may fear,
understandably, that few legislatures, if any, are likely to legalize PAS-and
the Supreme Court is unlikely to give the asserted right constitutional pro-
tection-if it is linked to active voluntary euthanasia "before its time."'
2
117. Cf DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: LIVING WITH MORALITY 107-
08 (1993) ("How can self-determination have any limits? Why are not the person's desires or mo-
tives, whatever they be, sufficient?").
118. HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND ASSISTED SUICIDE 49
(rev. ed. 1998) (criticizing this distinction as a justification for legalization of PAS); see also Calla-
han & White, supra note 110, at 6-7 (arguing that the distinction is baseless because the "power
differential" between physician and patients is essentially the same in both cases).
119. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legisla-
tion, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 969 n.3 (1958). Euthanasia has its origin in the Greek words eu (happy,
painless) and thanatos (death). Id.
120. One commentator has put it more gently: Proponents of physician-assisted death are well
aware that "euthanasia" is a term that has "strong emotionally laden connotations." DAN W. BRoCK,
LIFE AND DEATH 170 (1993).
121. Surely this explains in part why the nine physicians, lawyers, and ethicists who drafted a
"Model State Act" authorizing and regulating PAS-and wrote an accompanying article-did not
address active voluntary euthanasia. "Members of the public and the medical community disagree,"
they observed, "and we disagree among ourselves, as to whether there is an important difference
between the two concepts." Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 10 (1996).
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court recalled that it has "confirmed the validity of drawing
boundaries to prevent certain practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are con-
demned. Glucksberg found reasonable the State's 'fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it
down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia."' 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007)
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However, Professor Dan Brock, one of the most respected and eloquent
proponents of both PAS and active voluntary euthanasia, 22 has concluded
that the moral arguments for one apply to the other:
In physician-assisted suicide the patient acts last... whereas in euthanasia
the physician acts last by performing the physical equivalent of pushing
the button. In both cases, however, the choice rests fully with the patient.
In both the patient acts last in the sense of retaining the right to change his
or her mind until the point at which the lethal process becomes irreversi-
ble....
If there is no significant, intrinsic moral difference between the two, it
is hard to see why public or legal policy should permit one but not the
other; worries about abuse or about giving anyone dominion over the lives
of others apply equally to either."'
The distinction between PAS and euthanasia is difficult to defend as a mat-
ter of principle. The Ninth Circuit en banc majority did not try. Rather, it
only "agree[d] that it may be difficult to make a principled distinction" be-
tween the two practices.
24
If the claim that terminally (or seriously) ill people have a right to con-
trol the time and manner of their death is well founded, how can this right
be denied them-even though they otherwise "qualify"-because they lack
the capacity to place the lethal pills into their mouths or the capacity to
swallow them?
This point did not escape Justice Ginsburg. At one point during the oral
arguments, she suggested that the person who is helpless or in so much ag-
ony that she "is not able to assist in her own suicide," but must have a health
professional administer a lethal injection, is "in a more sympathetic situa-
tion" than one who is able to end her life merely with the preliminary
assistance of a physician.1
21
As we have seen, the lawyers for Doctors Glucksberg and Quill insisted
that the only question presented was the asserted right to PAS for the termi-
nally ill. The narrow way these lawyers framed the issue is quite
understandable. I would have done the same if I had been in their place. After
(quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732-35 & 733 n.23). Gonzales is discussed extensively elsewhere
in this Symposium by Calabresi, supra note 4.
122. Some evidence of the high regard in which Professor Brock is held is that when Profes-
sor Sunstein wrote The Right to Die, he quoted or referred to Brock's writings seven times-more
than he did any other proponent of assisted suicide or active euthanasia. Sunstein, supra note 32.
123. Brock, supra note 112, at 10. To the same effect is BROCK, supra note 120, at 203-04.
124. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 831 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. The distinction would also be difficult to maintain in practice.
Compare Lawrence 0. Gostin, Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The Law, and Law
Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94, 96 (1993), with Yale Kamisar,
Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAM-
INED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 99, at 225, 230-33.
125. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 29 (emphasis added).
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all, as Justice Frankfurter once observed, "The function of an advocate.., is
to seduce."
1 26
The function of a court, however, is to resist seduction. It should rest its
judgment on a principle of general significance that may be consistently
applied, and it should produce an intellectually coherent reason which in
like cases will produce a like result. If I may quote Justice Frankfurter a
second time, a court must decide the case before it but this does not mean
that the case should be decided without "due regard for what went before"
and without equal regard "for what may come after."'
27
D. The Right to Forgo Medical Treatment and the Right to PAS Are Not
Merely Subcategories of the Same Broad Right12
Few rallying cries or slogans are more stirring than the "right to die."
But few are more fuzzy or misunderstood. The phrase has been used loosely
by many people to embrace at least four different rights: (1) the right to
forgo unwanted medical procedures, including lifesaving treatment; (2) the
right to commit suicide; (3) the right to the assistance of another in commit-
ting suicide; and (4) the right to active voluntary euthanasia, i.e., the right to
authorize another to kill you intentionally and directly.
The right or liberty that the famous Karen Ann Quinlan case 29 estab-
lished and the Cruzan Court j3 recognized is the right under certain
circumstances to forgo life-sustaining medical treatment. Indeed, the
Quinlan case explicitly distinguished between letting die on the one hand,
and both direct killing and assisted suicide on the other.3 '
Nevertheless, many proponents of PAS have maintained that the same
ethical values, or the same constitutional doctrines, that support the right to
forgo life-sustaining treatment also support PAS." I call this the basic ar-
gument of PAS proponents.
1 33
For reasons spelled out elsewhere in this Symposium by my colleague
Steve Smith, 34 I do not deny that some of the arguments by PAS opponents
126. Felix Frankfurter, Mr Justice Jackson, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT
509, 511 (Philip Kurland ed., 1970).
127. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 661 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
128. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Liberty Equality, Death!, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-
June 1996, at 23, 23-24, so characterizing the reasoning in Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790, but
expressing his strong disagreement with this view.
129. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
130. For discussion of Cruzan, see supra note 75.
131. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 665, 670 & n.9.
132. E.g., Brock, supra note 112, at I1; Ronald Dworkin, Euthanasia, Morality and Law, 31
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1147, 1152-55 (1998); Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide
Constitutional? I Say No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 725, 729 (1995).
133. One might also view this as the principal component of what another contributor to the
Symposium calls "the now-standard liberal case for the right to die" (using the right in its broadest
sense). Spindelman, supra note 6, at 1642.
134. See Smith, supra note 6, at 1575-82.
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for distinguishing between PAS and the forgoing of life-sustaining medical
treatment are not convincing. I submit, however, that upon reflection the
same may be said for the basic argument of PAS proponents.
Justice Stevens, the Second and Ninth Circuits, and the commentators
who argue that PAS is a constitutionally protected fight have read a good
deal more into the well-established right to forgo medical treatment than is
really there.33 As Justice O'Connor underscored in her pivotal concurring
opinion in Cruzan, "Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures
[as the insertion of a nasogastric tube into her nose, throat, esophagus and
stomach] against her will burdens [her] liberty, dignity, and freedom to de-
termine the course of her own treatment."'3 6 As the New York State Task
Force pointed out, "It is [the] right against intrusion-not a general right to
control the timing and manner of death-that forms the basis of the consti-
tutional fight to refuse life-sustaining treatment .... [This fight] has a well-
established history in the laws of informed consent and battery."'
37
Not only would a prohibition against forgoing life-sustaining treatment
impose a more onerous burden on affected persons than does a ban on PAS,
but it would impair the autonomy of a great many people. As Justice Brennan
noted in his Cruzan dissenting opinion, most of the two million who die every
year in this country do so in hospitals and long-term care institutions, and
most of them do so "after a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment has
been made.' 3 8 If medical treatment could not be rejected, vast numbers of
patients would be "at the mercy of every technological advance."' 39 More-
over, if patients could refuse potentially life-sustaining treatment at the
outset, but not discontinue the treatment once it started, many patients
probably would not avail themselves of the treatment in the first place.' 4°
Allowing a patient to die at some point, I think it fair to say, is a practi-
cal condition upon the successful operation of medicine. The same can
hardly be said of PAS. Moreover, "the practice of forgoing treatment is by
now so deeply embedded in our social and medical practices that a reversal
135. See also the quotation from the "Philosophers' Brief' (an amicus brief filed by Ronald
Dworkin, John Rawls, and other prominent philosophers on behalf of the Glucksberg plaintiffs) set
forth elsewhere in this Symposium. Smith, supra note 6, at 1576 (quoting Brief for Ronald Dworkin
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 45, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708956).
136. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
137. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40. at 71-72 (footnote omitted).
138. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 75; see also CALLAHAN, supra note 117, at 77-
81. It is worth recalling that "[allthough there was no possibility that her condition would improve,
[Ms. Cruzan] could be kept 'alive' in her [persistent vegetative] state for as long as thirty years
through artificial feeding and hydration." Seidman, supra note 75, at 50.
140. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 40, at 75; Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths
About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 473, 481 (1995); see also CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 101-02, 106 (1999)
("It is reasonable to think that the risks of abuse are far greater in [PAS cases] than in cases of with-
drawal of life support.").
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of policy on this point would throw most of our major medical institutions
into a state approaching chaos."'' 4' Again, the same can hardly be said of re-
fusals to comply with requests for PAS.1
42
In short, when Art Buchwald tried dialysis twelve times and decided-
despite "tremendous pressure" to continue it-that he "didn't like it" and
didn't "want to do it anymore,"'' 43 I submit it was his choice to make and that
his doctors did not assist him in committing suicide when he made it. Would
it have mattered if staying on dialysis could have kept Mr. Buchwald alive
for another ten or fifteen years? So far as the law and the medical ethics
governing end-of-life care is concerned, no, not at all.
It is noteworthy that the right to forgo life-sustaining medical treatment
is not limited to the terminally ill (regardless of how that term is defined).
As the leading treatise-writer on the subject has put it, "the right of a com-
petent person to refuse medical treatment is virtually absolute.
' '
"
If, as many PAS proponents tell us, actively intervening to bring about
death and forgoing medical treatment are (or at least ought to be) "on an
equal footing before the law,' 45 and we are also told that the ight to forgo
medical treatment is "virtually absolute," how can we be expected to believe
that, once established, the ight to PAS will be limited to the terminally ill?
III. THE OREGON EXPERIENCE
This Foreword has explored the contours of the doctrinal debate sur-
rounding PAS, a debate that will be fleshed out in greater detail in the
following articles. Yet the doctrinal debate tells only part of the story. For
example, Professor Sunstein maintains elsewhere in this Symposium that
Glucksberg was "rightly decided, because the argument for a right to [PAS]
was too fragile in light of empirical realities; [PAS] might not, in fact, pro-
mote patient autonomy."'' 46 Surely Sunstein is not alone. More than a few
observers believe that when the Court revisits the questions presented by
Glucksberg, the experience in Oregon-the only state that has legalized
141. John Arras, News from the Circuit Courts: How Not to Think about Physician-assisted
Suicide, BIOLAW (SPECIAL SECTION), July-Aug. 1996, at S:171, S:183.
142. Some commentators worry that the arguments of PAS proponents may "work back-
wards" and lead to new restrictions on "the hard-won rights that the great majority of patients can
and do now exercise to refuse medical treatments." George J. Annas, The Promised End-
Constitutional Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 683, 686 (1996); see
also Susan M. Wolf, Holding the Line on Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL SUPPLE-
MENT), Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 13.
143. ART BUCHWALD, Too SOON TO SAY GOODBYE 15-16 (2006).
144. 1 MEISEL, supra note 110, § 8.2, at 470. Another leading commentator has been equally
emphatic on this point. See Cantor, supra note 57, at 193.
145. Alan Meisel, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Common Law Roadmap for State Courts, 24
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 849 (1997). As we have seen, in the context of equal protection the Court
has told us that these two practices do not stand on an equal footing before the law. See supra text
accompanying note 3.
146. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1547.
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PAS 47  will have an important bearing on the outcome. What has been the
Oregon experience? It seems that depends on whom you ask.
According to one contributor to this Symposium, Kathryn Tucker, the
director of legal affairs for Compassion and Choices 48 and the lawyer who
argued the case for the Glucksberg plaintiffs in the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Oregon record demonstrates that fears that various abuses might occur if
PAS were legalized can be (and have been) dispelled so long as a state es-
tablishes "regulation with teeth"'' 49 (to use Justice Souter's phrase). 50
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, another contributor to this Symposium, and a
strong critic of Glucksberg, also paints a rosy picture of the Oregon experi-
ence. According to him, the situation in Oregon strengthens the case for PAS
both as a matter of policy and as a matter of substantive due process."'
On the other hand, two other contributors to this Symposium, Herbert
Hendin (a professor of psychiatry and executive director of Suicide Preven-
tion International) and Kathleen Foley (a professor of neurology and pain
relief expert), take a much less sanguine view of the Oregon experience. 52
Many people, and at least some Supreme Court Justices, would welcome
a consensus on how well or how poorly the Oregon law is working. But if
the contributions to this Symposium are any indication, a consensus about
Oregon's experience may not emerge for quite a while. Indeed, disagree-
ment about the Oregon experience appears to be, and is likely to continue to
be, as vigorous as disputes over other aspects of PAS.
147. Oregon's Death with Dignity Act was approved via a ballot initiative in 1994, but did not
go into effect until after the Court's decision in Glucksberg. See Tucker, supra note 7, at 1600.
148. This organization is the successor to Compassion in Dying, the organization which insti-
tuted the lawsuit that led to the Glucksberg decision.
149. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
150. See Tucker, supra note 7.
151. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1513-15.
152. See Hendin & Foley, supra note 7.
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